The ‘stay and defend or leave early’ policy was introduced into Australia by Emergency Services after the Ash Wednesday fires of 1983. It advises people to either leave early in the day when there is a high fire risk to their property or prepare and defend their house, sheltering inside when the fire arrives. The policy is implemented in all states and territories (except WA) by the relevant state fire authorities to encourage homeowners the think ahead to what they would do if their property was threatened by a fire. Whether this policy should remain in its current form is currently being widely debated in light of the catastrophic effects of the Black Saturday Bushfires, 7th February 2009, when 173 people died and over were 2000 homes destroyed. This essay attempts to it examine the policy and explain its flaws. Secondly it will look into the decision making process that home owners go through to decide whether to stay or leave a property when it is threatened by fire, and whether authorities should have to power to forcibly evacuate homes. The two main problems with the policy is that there is ambiguity of what ‘leave early’ actually means and there are days when weather conditions make successfully protecting a home almost impossible. Decision making becomes harder when time pressure and stress are added in situations, such as being threatened by fire, and people are more likely to not be confident in their choice and change their mind (Janis, 1982).
In weather conditions like those experienced on Black Saturday, the chances of successfully saving homes without loosing lives reduces significantly. All of the rural fire authorities (except WA) and the Bureau of Meteorology (CSIRO website) use an index called the McArthur Forest Fire Danger Meter (FFDM). It was developed by the CSIRO in 1967 to predict fire severity based on factors such as the humidity, wind speed, temperature and combustibility of fuel at a given time and place. This information is then able to give a Forest Fire Danger Index (FFDI) which has a scale of 1-100. A fire on a day with an index of one (1) a fire is not able to burn, compared to the other end of the scale, if a fire starts on a day with an index of one hundred (100) the fire will burn so hot and fast, control is virtually impossible. It is designed so a score of 100 represents the weather conditions on Black Friday, 1939 (Tiggelen 2009). Scores over 100 are rare, and are seen as ‘once in a generation’ events such as Ash Wednesday and The Black Weekend in Canberra. The score for central Victoria on Black Saturday was 150 while in Kilmore, where the most devastation occurred, the score reached 189 (Tiggelen 2009). Every day with a FFDI score over 100 where a fire has broken out, the destruction of bushland, homes and lives has been catastrophic. Defending homes in those conditions is almost impossible, with many houses only being saved only by the helicopters dumping water on them. The stay and defend policy in those conditions appears more risky than sensible, and people are starting to ask if mandatory evacuations should be put in place in extreme circumstances. John van Tiggelen (2009) thinks, “where the stay-or-leave-early policy starts to look decidedly shaky is at an FFDI of around 75 points…at 100 points, the policy is murder.” This evidence calls for a rethink of how Authorities communicate with people who are facing a bushfire threat. Perhaps the FFDI score should be put with weather reports over the fire season, so homeowners can make a more informed decision about whether to ‘stay and defend, or leave early.’
The ambiguity of what ‘stay and defend or leave early’ means often confuses people in the community on how they should prepare a fire fighting plan. According to Professor John Handmer, director of the Centre for Risk and Community Safety ‘leaving early’ means “early in the day, well before you think you're clearly at risk” (7.30 report 10/02/09) but with many people leaving when the fire is about to arrive, this definition should be made more clear to those at risk. Research shows that when the level of stress is very high, a decision maker is likely to display premature closure (Janis 1983). This means they make a decision without considering all the available alternatives. When the time pressure and stress of making such a decision is added, many people are unable to feel confident in the decision they have made. Consequently they second guess what they have decided when the fire approaches and change their minds without considering the different options carefully. The most deaths in fires are caused when people flee their homes in a car as the fire front arrives (NSW Rural Fire Service). The treacherous conditions on the road cause accidents to occur and the car cannot provide adequate shelter from the fires.
People have different reasons for staying with their houses when they are threatened by fire. Quarantelli (1980. [cited in Murray, 1999]) conducted a wide survey into disaster evacuations. He found that people with young children were more likely to evacuate, but the elderly were more likely to stay with their home, even if advised to evacuate. He also looked into the warning systems employed by authorities in disaster situations. His findings are highly relevant to the Black Saturday fires as he claimed that a moderate amount of fear or anxiety must be aroused before people will be inclined to believe or act upon warning messages, but too much fear or anxiety may simply lead to inaction. On Black Saturday the fires moved so fast, and the warning systems so slow in comparison, that many people did not know a fire was threatening them until it actually arrived, and when it did people did not know what to do (Hughes, 2009) . Some stay because of financial reasons, if their house is not insured they would be more likely to want to stay to protect it because if it burnt down there wouldn’t be any insurance cover to pay for rebuilding. A study done by Wilson and Ferguson (1984. [cited in Murray, 1999]) into the Ash Wednesday fires found that 90% of homes who were attended by able bodied people survived while only 30% of homes that were unattended survived. An article in the Australian (Wahlquist & Clayfield, 2009) claimed that one in five houses did not have any home or contents insurance which would influence the decision those people made in deciding whether to stay or leave, as their house would statistically have a better survival rate if they stayed.
This poses the question ‘If they were told to leave by Authorities, would they?’ It would be very hard to make someone leave their house if they did not want to leave, and currently only the Police have the legal power to enforce evacuations. Although there is no real precedent for mass evacuations in Australia, in America authorities have faced refusal of people to leave their properties in events such as hurricanes and bushfires. Short of arresting those for not cooperating with a police officer there is little the authorities can do other than leave them there. Is it worth spending precious time arguing with people instead of alerting others to the threat? Phil Cheney (1995 [cited in Murray,1999]) thinks the crux of the issue is “It is a civil right to risk your own life to save your house". Can anyone make this decision other than the person who is putting their life at risk?
The pressure put on infrastructure in a mass evacuation is huge. The effect of possibly thousands of extra cars on roads could cause delays and traffic jams which according to David Packham (2009) could end up being more dangerous and deadly than people staying and sheltering in houses. Where would these people evacuate too? The stress on temporary housing would be significant, especially if many houses were not able to be returned to because they were destroyed. Tent ‘cities’ would emerge along with many people living in caravans such as was seen in America with the devastation of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina. In America mass evacuations when bushfires threaten is the norm. In California, where bushfires are a common occurrence, people are evacuated by authorities well before the bushfire arrives. They were considering implementing a ‘stay and defend or leave early’ policy similar to Australia’s but after the results of Black Saturday those plans have been halted (Mitchell, 2009) . In Mitchell’s article he interviews a Senior Californian Fire-fighter, Chip Prather who thinks the stay and defend policy is “foolish.” Should Australia consider the American view that this policy just endangers lives of people who are not trained or prepared to fight a full force bushfire? The Royal Commission is looking into this idea with an article by the Age (Kissane, 2009) quoting figures comparing the 2007 California fires to the Black Saturday fires. The fires in California destroyed 3069 houses but nearly one million residents were evacuated from 350,000 homes, and only 10 people died. In Victoria on Black Saturday, more than 2000 homes were destroyed and 173 people died. These figures show that while more houses could be lost, more lives could be saved. Houses can be rebuilt, but once gone, life cannot be returned.
There are many pros and cons for both staying and defending or leaving a home threatened by fire. The person making the decision when under threat of bushfire has to ask themselves what the probability of successfully saving their house is, and are they willing to take the risk of loosing their life to save their house. If their answer is no, they should prepare their house to the best of their ability and leave as soon as possible to safety. If their answer is yes, they better pray that the FFDI is under 75 and certainly not over 100, because if it is, history shows that no amount of preparation will save them.
